The north-west region of Somalia split off, declaring itself the independent Republic of Somaliland. Somaliland has enjoyed relative stability, but Somalia has plunged into a raging civil war involving rival warlords and Islamist militants.  The more than two decades of violence that have ensued have devastated the country and caused the deaths of up to a million people.

The UN entered Somalia in July 1992 to provide humanitarian relief amid escalating violence. By December 1993, with the situation deteriorating, the UN asked member states for assistance. The US obliged, sending troops into Mogadishu.

But during a disastrous 15-hour battle with militiamen in August 1993, two US Black Hawk helicopters were brought down. Eighteen American soldiers died in related operations.  In the book Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War it is estimated that more than 700 Somali militiamen and civilians died in the battle.

Famine
This ‘failed state’ recently experienced the worst humanitarian crisis in Africa’s history, with those needing UN assistance increasing from an estimated two million at the start of 2011 to four million by September 2011. The Somalia Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit declared a state of famine in six areas in southern Somalia in 2011.

Somalia’s acting government, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), was created to try and impose some sort of stability and coherence. Set up by peace talks held in Kenya between 2002 and 2004, the TFG was, and continues to be, recognised by the UN and the international community.

See the Bureau’s full data on Somalia’s hidden war 

But in its early days the TFG had little success. It was ousted in early 2006, when a conflict between clan-based militias came to an ‘uneasy truce… with the rise to power of the militia-backed Islamic Courts Union’, explained Human Rights Watch.

The ICU mirrored aspects of the Taliban. As Bill Roggio of the Long War Journal reported, ‘Over the course of the summer and fall of 2006, The Islamic Courts consolidated its power in central and southern Somalia. It began to impose a strict version of sharia, or Islamic law, and shut down movie theaters, viewing centers for soccer matches and co-ed events such as sports. Cigarettes, alcohol and khat, the popular leafy narcotic chewed by Somalis, were banned.’

As the ICU marched into Mogadishu, thousands of civilians fled the capital. By mid-2006, the ICU had taken over Mogadishu, as well as much of south and central Somalia.

Abandoned tank in Somalia Sept 2007 (Carl Montgomery/Flickr)

Ethiopia invades
But the ICU’s rule did not last. In December 2006, the TFG, supported by the Ethiopian army, began a lengthy battle which would eventually defeat the ICU. At the time Human Rights Watch reported, ‘outside powers such as Ethiopia, the United States, and the European Union feared that the ICU and its radical armed youth wing, al-Shabaab, would create an Islamist bastion in Somalia’.

For two years, Ethiopia fought ICU militias and the emerging al Shabaab. It was joined in January 2007 by a UN-created peace force comprising African Union troops – AMISOM (see below).

As mentioned in the Bureau’s Somalia timeline, several sources report that Ethiopia received extensive backing from the US during its invasion, with the Nation’s Jeremy Scahill calling the invasion ‘a classic [US] proxy war’.

And as 10,000 troops crossed the border, they received airborne reconnaissance support and ‘other intelligence’ from the US, the Washington Post reported.

But diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks reveal a different story, with US officials seemingly urging caution. A December 6 2007 cable recorded US Ambassador to Ethiopia Donald Yamamoto warning Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi the invasion could ‘prove more difficult for Ethiopia than many now imagine’.

When the ICU was defeated and Ethiopia withdrew in 2009, some Somalis turned against the foreign invaders. Despite its harsh rule, the ICU had brought an element of stability to Somalia, having defeated the warlords and imposed Islamic religious laws.

‘It’s not just that people miss those days,’ a Somali humanitarian worker told the Chicago Tribune. ‘They resent the Ethiopians and Americans tearing it all up, using Somalia as their battlefield against global terrorism. It’s like the Cold War all over again. Somalis aren’t in control.’

The emergence of al Shabaab
The TFG had regained an element of control. But to the south of the capital, another Islamic faction was growing: al Shabaab, also known as the Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin. Originally the ICU’s militant wing, al-Shabaab forged its own identity. Its aim is to dismantle the TFG, to ‘mount sustained attacks against the transitional federal institutions and their security forces, as well as AMISOM, and to threaten the political process’, commented the 2011 UN Monitoring Group on Somalia’s report. In 2007, al Shabaab’s leaders claimed affiliation with al-Qaeda (the group formally announced this union on February 9 2012).

In February 2008 the US designated al Shabaab a terrorist organisation. Al Shabaab has committed widespread human rights abuses, reported Human Rights Watch, ‘including punishments such as beheadings, amputations, stoning and beatings, restrictions on dress and freedom of movement, enforced contributions, and forcible recruitment into the militia.’ In addition, HRW says,’Al-Shabaab admits to the recruitment of children, who are represented among many recent deaths and defections in their forces’.

A representative of GarGar Foundation for Development, a charity for Somali women, told the Bureau that under Shabaab, ‘there is a lack of education, lack of health services, and there are often reports of women getting raped’.

Kenya follows Ethiopia’s lead
On October 16 2011, Kenya invaded Somalia. The invasion, codenamed Operation Linda Nchi, was ostensibly a response to three separate kidnappings of westerners by al Shabaab militants in the preceding weeks, all on Kenyan soil.

But Alfred Mutua, the Kenyan government’s chief spokesman, told the New York Times the kidnappings were more a ‘good launchpad’ than the sole reason for invasion. ‘An operation of this magnitude is not planned in a week,’ Mutua said. ‘It’s been in the pipeline for a while.’

Speaking to the Financial Times, Matua said while the Kenyan forces wanted to locate the kidnappers, their mission went far deeper: to ‘track down and dismantle the al-Shabaab’.

While cooperation with US forces was mooted by the media at the start of Kenya’s invasion, several US officials have ‘explicitly denied coordination with the Kenyan military or any contribution of direct military support,’ said Dr Micah Zenko, fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, writing in the Atlantic. On October 25, the US stated that it was emphatically not participating in the invasion.

The invasion has not only appeared in the news, it has also been prominent in social media, with the Kenyan army and al Shabaab taking the battle onto Twitter.

As of February 22 2012, the Kenyan incursion is ongoing. The TFG’s mandate is set to expire in August 2012.

A malnourished child awaits AMISOM medical help in the 2011 drought (UN/Flickr)

As many as 20 US military strikes in Somalia since 2007 have killed up to 162 people, new research by the Bureau indicates. Of those killed, between 11 and 59 people are reported to be civilians.

US military intervention in war-torn Somalia is shown to be on a far lower scale than in Yemen or Pakistan. However, US attacks escalated sharply against al Shabaab targets in 2011.

The Bureau has carried out a detailed examination of reports of western military activity in Somalia spanning over more than a decade. These are drawn from credible media, from academic research, from US and UK military and diplomatic records and from other reputable sources.

The research team has sought to untangle often conflicting original reports, and to confirm where possible all incidents. Although over 70 US strikes have been reported since 2007, for example, the Bureau believes that fewer than a third of such claims appear credible.

The findings reveal a complex web of shifting enemies, of invasions and proxy wars, and secretive and deadly US Special Forces attacks.

Strikes
The Bureau’s database, released today, chronicles more than 50 documented events dating from 2001. These range from surveillance and counter-piracy operations in Somalia, to heavy airstrikes and drone attacks on alleged Islamic militants.

The research reveals that between eight and 20 US counter-terrorism attacks have taken place in Somalia between 2007 and 2012. Between 46 and 162 people are reported killed in these events, mostly alleged militants.

However between 11 and 59 of those killed were reported to have been civilians.

The total number of casualties may be higher.  Some reports simply state ‘many killed’, and other attacks may be unrecorded.

Covert surveillance
The Bureau’s study shows distinct phases in western military intervention. Just weeks after the terrorist atrocities of September 11 2001, US Special Forces became active in Somalia. There were fears the failed nation might become another Afghanistan, supporting al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organisations.

Between 2001 and December 2006, that US engagement consisted mainly of a number of covert surveillance operations. In March 2003, for example, US commandos planted a dozen concealed cameras on the Somali coast to monitor militant activity.

The US also carried out extraordinary renditions of an estimated eight terror suspects during this period. The Bureau has so far identified two of the men as Suleiman Abdallah, taken in March 2003; and Mohammed Ali Isse, seized in June 2004.

Related story: Somalia – a bullet-riddled history

Airstrikes
December 2006 triggered a new phase of US involvement. The Pentagon’s Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) took advantage of Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia to launch a series of air, naval and ground attacks against alleged al Qaeda militants.

In this second phase, according to Dr Micah Zenko of the Council on Foreign Relations, such strikes ‘weren’t about shaping Somalia but about going after particular individuals tied to specific terrorist plots, who happened to be there.’

In January 2007, US Special Forces AC-130 gunships struck militant camps up to four times. Between 26 and 61 people died in the attacks – including between 6 and 35 civilians. And in June 2007 the USS Chafee carried out a rare naval bombardment on Islamic militants in northern Somalia, killing a dozen.

US AC-130 gunships have been primary platform for attack in Somalia (Lockheed Martin/ Flickr)

In the third and present phase, which began in late spring 2011, the US began targeting al Shabaab directly, with the militant organisation now perceived as a key threat to US homeland security. As President Obama’s chief counter-terrorism adviser John Brennan spelled out last October:

Al-Qaida traditionally has taken advantage of areas that are wracked by conflict, turmoil and lack of government, it is a safe haven they see to launch attacks… Somalia is one of the most challenging areas of the world because it has this internal conflict, it has such a devastating famine, and it is an area that al-Qaida has tried regularly to exploit.

Drone strikes: 2011 to present
The Bureau’s research shows that, after a reporting gap of 18 months, the US definitively returned to the offensive in Somalia with its first drone strike on June 23 2011. The strike was aimed at senior al Shabaab leaders, though it remains unclear how many – if any – died.

The Special Forces drones – independent from the CIA’s fleet – operate from bases in Djibouti, Ethiopia and possibly the Seychelles. By February 2012 between three and 11 drone strikes had reportedly taken place.

Though the Bureau has striven to untangle confused reporting of western military activity in Somalia, much remains opaque – something the US seems keen to see continue.

‘We cannot provide specific operational details,’ senior Pentagon spokesman Lt Col James Gregory recently told the Bureau. ‘Regarding Somalia, we are supportive of the African Union Mission there and the Transitional Federal Government efforts as they continue to fight terrorism.’

The Somalia data compares with some 316 CIA drone strikes in Pakistan since 2004 which have killed between 2,400 and 3,000 people, according to the Bureau’s data.

Additional reporting by Emma Slater, Alice Ross and David Pegg

Follow Chris Woods on Twitter @chrisjwoods

A new Bureau study of western military operations in Somalia reveals that up to six UK citizens have died in attacks carried out by the US and its allies.

The findings appear to support rising UK concerns about the security situation in the east African nation.

With indications that the UK may be seeking to move beyond its current anti-piracy operations in Somalia, any deeper engagement risks drawing Britain into a complex web of shifting enemies, proxy wars and secretive Special Forces operations.

The present UK role contrasts sharply with the United States, which the Bureau reveals has launched up to 20 strikes aganst terrorist suspects over the past five years. Between 46 and 162 people – mostly alleged militants – are reported killed in those attacks.

Political will
As world leaders gather in London on Thursday to hear Britain’s vision of a new deal for war-torn Somalia, the emphasis is on rebuilding a shattered nation.

Yet at a preparatory conference in early February, Foreign Secretary William Hague also hinted at increased British military involvement, stating: ‘We must make it harder for terrorists to operate in and out of Somalia.’

The Guardian has also revealed that the UK has drawn up contingency plans for possible airstrikes on pirates and terrorists.

One source told the paper: ‘There was no political will on this to begin with, but that has been changing. We know where the camps are, where they set up and where they launch from.’

Related story: Get the data – Somalia’s hidden war

Direct threat
So is there a risk that Britain will be drawn deeper into Somalia’s decades-long conflict? And how involved are we already?

So far, the Bureau’s study shows, Britain’s role has mainly focused on countering Somali pirates. The UK’s naval assets – part of Coalition Task Force 150 – are widely used in board and search operations.

On January 13 this year for example, Royal Marine commandos captured 13 Somali pirates.

British military trainers have also helped instruct other African armies for a role in Amisom, the African peace-keeping force in Somalia.

Yet since 2011 UK’s forces are increasingly being engaged on the ground in Somalia. This may reflect a growing fear that Somali militants represent a direct threat to UK interests.

In June 2011 the Special Boat Squadron reportedly finished an eight-week programme mapping the ports used by Somali pirates.

And on July 9 2011, a Royal Navy ship the RFA Cardigan Bay docked in the Somali port of Berbera. Royal Marines reportedly disembarked in armoured vehicles, pushing some miles inland to rendezvous with a tribal leader and bring him to a meeting with UK officials.

Related story: Somalia – a bullet-riddled history

British militants
Although British efforts have predominantly focused on tackling piracy, the UK’s National Security Council recently classified Somalia as ‘a priority country.’

The UK has been ‘war gaming’ possible airstrikes against militant al-Shabaab bases in Somalia, according to the Guardian.

And dozens of British volunteers have already been drawn to militant groups in the war-torn nation, recent reports have suggested.

The Bureau has found as many as six British citizens have been killed in attacks by the US and its allies.

In March 2007, a single source claims that British SAS troops, working with members of US Delta Force, entered Somalia and took DNA samples relating to four Britons killed in an American strike that took place in January of that year.

On June 1 2007, at least one British militant was reported killed in a US naval bombardment.

And on January 21 2012 British-Lebanese militant Bilal al-Barjawi was killed in a US drone strike near Mogadishu.

A movement by the UK towards attacks on al Shabaab in Somalia might indicate that US and UK counter-terrorism interests may be coinciding, according to Dr Micah Zenko of the Council on Foreign Relations:

‘The US emphasis is now on disrupting active plots in Somalia against the US homeland. And where you see such plots, you often see attacks planned against the UK and other US allies,’ he told the Bureau this week.

Additional reporting by Emma Slater, Alice Ross and David Pegg

Follow Chris Woods on Twitter @chrisjwoods

The Pentagon’s Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is the lead agency in the covert ‘war on terror’ in Somalia, although the CIA also has a strong regional presence.

The US has been carrying out extensive covert military operations inside Somalia since 2001, as a major six-part investigation by the US Army Times recently revealed.

Elite troops from the Pentagon’s JSOC are routinely deployed on the ground for surveillance, reconnaissance, and assault and capture operations. In June 2011, the US began carrying out drone strikes in Somalia. JSOC has its own fleet of armed Reaper drones, which are flown from various bases in the region.

The CIA also operates a secret base at Mogadishu airport, according to a detailed investigation by Jeremy Scahill at The Nation. Unarmed US surveillance drones also regularly fly from the airport, according to a well-informed Bureau source. While some of these are part of the US ‘war on terror’, many provide support for peacekeeping operations in the region.

The US’s primary target is currently al Shabaab, the militant group which controls much of the country’s south. On February 9 2012, al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri announced that al Shabaab had formally become a franchise of al Qaeda.

In recent years, both Kenya and Ethiopia have invaded parts of Somalia, the latter allegedly with the military aid of the US. JSOC forces are reported to have taken advantage of these events to carry out more intensive operations against militants, often using helicopters, airstrikes, AC-130 gunships and ‘boots on the ground’.

Related story: Militants and civilians killed in multiple US Somalia strikes

Key reports of operations in Somalia
The Bureau has collated credible reports of known covert operations and other events in Somalia relating to the ‘war on terror’. These are drawn from major international news media and agencies, political and military memoirs and papers, and academic research. All sources are transparently presented.

Given the nature of covert operations and the difficulties in reporting from Somalia, the Bureau understands that this is an incomplete record. We welcome corrections and additions.

SOM001
2001
In 2001, the Bush administration reportedly considered military strikes against Somalia, accusing it of having ties to al Qaeda. Action was abandoned because of insufficient intelligence. ‘Somalia has been a place that has harboured al Qaeda and, to my knowledge, still is’, then-defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld said in 2001. Military flights in P-3 aircraft conducted surveillance while an increased numbers of US ships and submarines patrolled the Somali coastline. Reportedly about 100 US Special Forces operated in the country, similar to early incursions into Afghanistan. On December 2, 2001, the UK Daily Telegraph reported that the US had asked the UK for assistance in planning strikes on ‘terror bases’ in Somalia.

Location: Somalia various
References: Menkhaus 2004, The Guardian, Africa Confidential, The Telegraph, The Telegraph

SOM002
November 2001
Washington placed Hassan Dahir Aweys (pictured) on its terrorist list. Aweys was the head of the 90-member shura council of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) of Somalia and was viewed as one of its more radical leaders. The US also declared the suspected terrorist Fazul Abdullah Mohamed was operating within Somali borders. Sanctions on individuals soon expanded to groups. On November 7 2001, the US Treasury blocked the assets of the largest Somali telecommunications and remittance network, al-Barakaat. According to a November 2001 press release by the White House, al-Barakaat offices ‘raise, manage and distribute funds for al-Qaeda; provide terrorist supporters with Internet service and secure telephone communications; and arrange for the shipment of weapons’.

Location: Washington DC, Mogadishu
References: De Waal & Salam 2004, International Crisis Group, Harper 2007, Menkhaus 2004, George W Bush Archive

SOM003
Late 2001, early 2002
A major investigation by the US Army Times has revealed that in the first years following the September 11 attacks, there were rumours of potential al Qaeda training camps in Ras Kamboni, a coastal town about two miles from the Kenyan border. ‘We were throwing people at Ras Kamboni … in late ‘01, early ‘02,‘ an intelligence source with long experience in the Horn of Africa told reporter Sean D. Naylor. Looking specifically at JSOC, an intelligence source told Naylor that ‘between 2001 and 2004, JSOC never had more than three people at a time in Somalia’.

Location: Ras Kamboni
References: Army Times, Army Times, De Waal & Salam 2004

SOM004
March 19 2003
A team of US commandos snatched suspected al Qaeda terrorist Suleiman Abdallah from a hospital in Mogadishu and transported him out of the country for questioning. ‘Staff at the Kaysaney Red Cross Hospital said a six-man team in plain clothes snatched the suspect from his bed and rushed him to an airstrip in a raid lasting only minutes. It appears that the Americans were working with a militia faction that controls the area around the hospital in the north of the city’, the Telegraph reported. The TFG told the Telegraph the US team included ‘4 or 5‘ FBI agents. Matt Bryden, coordinator for the UN monitoring group on Somalia, and Somalia analyst at the International Crisis Group, wrote in autumn 2003 that Abdallah was a Yemeni national:

Although intelligence officials have not publicly disclosed evidence linking Abdallah to any terrorist acts, he was found to be in possession of a list of former and serving US government officials, suggesting a planned attack on American targets.

Abdallah was captured ‘by a notorious warlord named Mohammed Dheere‘, legal charity Reprieve told the Bureau. He was then ‘sold to the CIA and then rendered to Djibouti, Kenya and Afghanistan‘. Abdallah was held by the US for ‘over five years in incommunicado detention in the Salt Pit, the Dark Prison and Bagram Airforce Base‘, before being released in 2008. The case has been documented in a UN secret detention report.

Type of action: Ground operation, rendition
Location: Mogadishu
References: Boston College International & Comparative Law Review , Daily Telegraph, Journal of Conflict Studies, Reprieve, UN

SOM005
November 2003
US special forces infiltrated Somalian waters in 2003 and planted a dozen or more concealed cameras, as part of Operations Cobalt Blue and Poison Scepter, the Army Times revealed. According to reporter Sean D. Naylor, on January 12 2004 a fisherman discovered one of the cameras. ‘Asked what the secret camera missions achieved, the intel source with long experience on the Horn answered bluntly: “Nothing”.’

Type of action: Ground operation, surveillance
Location: Northern/eastern coast of Somalia
Reference: Army Times

SOM006
2003
Again according to Sean D. Naylor of the Army Times, beginning in 2003 teams of CIA case officers and ‘shooters’ from a special operations unit - Task Force Orange - flew into Somalia from Nairobi. Initially the teams gathered intelligence. ‘They soon expanded to include working with warlords to hunt al-Qaida members, tapping cellphones, purchasing [back] anti-aircraft missiles and, ultimately, developing a deeper understanding of al-Qaida’s East African franchise and how it fit into the wider al-Qaida network,’ Naylor reported. In an effort to develop targets, the CIA, supported by TF Orange, ran a series of missions into Mogadishu to ‘seed’ the city with devices that monitored mobile phone traffic, according to a senior military official. Mobile phone tapping targets included Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, one of the original al-Qaida in East Africa leaders, as well as two senior figures in Somalia’s al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab militia: Aden Hashi Ayro, who allegedly trained in al Qaeda’s Afghanistan camps, and Ahmed Abdi Godane, the group’s leader from 2009 to 2010, according to the intelligence official.

Location: Mogadishu
Reference: Army Times

SOM007
Late 2003 to early 2004
Interest in Ras Kamboni resumed in late 2003 to early 2004, when US personnel flew over the town but saw no sign of any training camps. At that time, the US were also paying ‘unilateral assets’ – spies – to enter southern Somalia, including Ras Kamboni, and report on what they observed. Paid $1,000 – $2,000 a month, these were ‘Somalis who had businesses in the region, Somalis who had reason to be there,’ the source said. ‘People we could depend on.’ According to the International Crisis Group, key individuals paid by the US for counter-terrorism included ‘Mohamed Omar Habeeb (aka Mohamed Dheere, regional ‘governor’ of the Middle Shabelle), Bashir Raghe (a northern Mogadishu businessman), Mohamed Qanyare Afrah Hussein Aydiid, and Generals Mohamed Nur Galal and Ahmed Hili’ow Addow’. By 2006, the US was paying Somali militants up to $150,000 a month for their support.

Location: Ras Kamboni
References: Army Times, International Crisis Group, Prendergast & Thomas-Jensen

SOM008
June 2004
One night in June 2004, Mohammed Ali Isse was captured in a CIA-ordered raid on his Mogadishu safe house by the Americans. A Somalilander, Isse was reportedly radicalised by the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and is now serving a life sentence for masterminding the killings of four foreign aid workers, including two British teachers, in late 2003 and early 2004. Mohamed Afrah Qanyare, a ‘scar-faced warlord in a business suit’, told the Chicago Tribune: ‘I captured Isse for the Americans…The Americans contracted us to do certain things, and we did them. Isse put up resistance so we shot him. But he survived.’ Legal charity Reprieve told the Bureau that Isse was rendered to a warship off the coast of Djibouti. ‘He was later flown to Camp Lemonier’ the Chicago Tribune reported, ’and from there to a clandestine prison in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Isse and his lawyer allege he was detained there for six weeks and tortured by Ethiopian military intelligence with electric shocks’. Isse was finally returned to Somaliland, where he remains imprisoned.

Type of action: Ground operation, rendition
Location: Mogadishu
References: Chicago Tribune, Reprieve, Amnesty

SOM009
2001 – 2005
During this period, warlords paid by the CIA helped render ‘seven or eight‘ al-Qaida figures out of Somalia, Sean D. Naylor of the Army Times reported. This included suspected al Qaeda terrorist Suleiman Abdallah from a hospital in Mogadishu in March 2003 (SOM004) and Mohammed Ali Isse, a Somalilander captured by warlords in Mogadishu in 2004 and rendered to a warship off the coast of Djibouti, before being imprisoned in Somaliland (SOM008). As the Chicago Tribune reported, ‘the Somalis on the CIA payroll engaged in a grim tit-for-tat exchange of kidnappings and assassinations with extremists.’ However, Matt Bryden, coordinator for the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, told the Chicago Tribune that, in his opinion, the CIA’s cooperation with the warlords was ‘a stupid idea… it actually strengthened the hand of the Islamists and helped trigger the crisis we’re in today.‘

Type of action: Ground operation, rendition 
References: Army Times, Boston College International & Comparative Law Review, Daily Telegraph, Journal of Conflict Studies, Reprieve, UN, Chicago Tribune

SOM010
June 2006
Confidential emails seen by Africa Confidential and the Observer indicated that US mercenaries may have been operating in Somalia with the knowledge of the CIA. There was also a suggestion that British companies were ‘looking to get involved.’ One email dated June 16 was from Michele Ballarin, chief executive of Select Armor – a US military firm based in Virginia. She claimed that she had been given ‘carte blanche‘ to use three bases in Somalia ‘and the air access to reach them‘.

References: Africa Confidential September 8 2006 (paywall), The Observer

SOM011
December 24 2006
Ethiopia invaded Somalia aiming to drive out the Islamic Courts Union, and to reinstate the Transitional Somali Government. Several sources reported that Ethiopia received extensive backing from the US, with the Nation’s Jeremy Scahill calling the invasion ‘a classic [US] proxy war’. As 10,000 troops crossed the border, they received airborne reconnaissance support and ‘other intelligence’ from the US, the Washington Post reported. Pentagon spokesman Lieutenant Commander Joe Carpenter told USA Today the US and Ethiopian militaries have ‘a close working relationship’. The US also began diverting drones to Somalia to monitor a perceived rise in militant activity. An intelligence source told the Army Times:

 We really took [a] risk in Iraq and Afghanistan and brought resources there [to the Horn].

But Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer later told the BBC: ‘We urged the Ethiopian military not to go into Somalia’. In a December 6 diplomatic cable quoted by Army Times, US Ambassador to Ethiopia Donald Yamamoto warned the Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi that the invasion could ‘prove more difficult for Ethiopia than many now imagine’. JSOC was unprepared for the invasion, a senior military official told the Army Times. ‘The military wasn’t prepared to take any advantage of it,’ he said. ‘Less than a dozen’ JSOC operators entered the country with Ethiopian special forces to hunt down a small number of senior al Qaeda associates. By December 28, Ethiopian forces had entered Mogadishu as militants fled to the south.

References: Army Times, Air Force Times, The Nation, Washington Post, BBC, LA Times, IRIN, USA Today, WikiLeaks diplomatic cable

SOM012
2007
The US became convinced that ‘hundreds‘ of fighters were training in camps in and around Ras Kamboni, a senior intelligence official told Sean D. Naylor. ‘We observed two that had at least 150 personnel per [at any one time],’ the official said.

Location: Ras Kamboni
Reference: Army Times

SOM013
January 4 2007
Naval forces from Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 were boarding vessels off the coast of Somalia to search for terrorist suspects, the US announced. These ‘Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure’ (VBSS) missions were performed on fishing boats and oil tankers passing near the Somali coast. The aim was to ‘deter individuals with links to al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations the use of the sea as a potential escape route’.

Location: Off the coast of Somalia
Reference: US Department of Defense

SOM014
January 7 2007
♦ 9-12 total reported killed
♦ 2+ civilians reported killed including ‘many children’
♦ 3 reported injured
As Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia, the US carried out its first US combat operation within Somalia since the September 11, 2001 attacks. A JSOC AC-130 gunship attacked a suspected al Qaeda convoy under cover of darkness, after tracking it with a Predator drone. Seven to 10 militants were killed. US officials, speaking anonymously, named various al Qaeda members as potential targets including Tariq Abdullah, Aden Hashi Eyro or Ayro, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, and Sudanese explosives expert Abu Talha al-Sudani. According to several reports, targets were those believed to be responsible for the 1998 embassy bombings, which killed 225 people. Somali government spokesman Abdul Rashid Hidig told the New York Times that two civilians were killed, although an Islamist spokesman said many nomadic tribesmen died, including many children. US Ambassador to Kenya Michael Rannenberger denied any civilian casualties in an interview with the BBC. Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman told CBS News the strike was based on intelligence ‘that led us to believe we had principal al-Qaeda leaders in an area where we could identify them and take action against them.’ But another US official told the Washington Post: ‘Frankly, I don’t think we know who we killed.’ A team of Ethiopian military with one US Special Forces operative landed at the scene within hours and confirmed eight dead and three injured, the New York Times reported the following month. Ayro’s bloodied passport was found, leading them to believe he had been wounded or killed, the report added – although Ayro was later targeted in SOM022. Fazul Abdullah Mohammed was also reportedly the target of SOM15, SOM019 and SOM030. A later report in the Daily Mail claimed four British citizens were killed in the attack (see SOM018).

Type of action: Air operation, AC-130 gunship
Location: Ras Kamboni
References: Somalia Report, Between Threats and War (Zenko) p. 145, Army Times, CBS News, International Crisis Group, Menkhaus, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, New York Times, Long War Journal, Daily Mail, AP via ChinaDaily

SOM015
January 9 2007
♦ 5-10 total reported killed
♦ 4-5 reported injured
Two days after the AC-130 attack, another US airstrike hit four towns near Ras Kamboni, including a training camp on Badmadow island. US officials denied to the LA Times that SOM015 and SOM016 were the work of US forces and blamed Ethiopian air attacks, although this appears to be contradicted by a January 12 2007 WikiLeaks cable, which refers to a ‘US military … strike Jan. 9 against members of the East Africa Al Qaeda cell believed to be on the run in a remote area of Somalia near the Kenyan border.’ A US intelligence official, speaking anonymously, told AP that five to ten people targeted by the strike were believed to be associated with al Qaeda. The US military’s main target on the island was thought to be Fazul Abdullah Mohammed. Although reports suggested he had been killed, he was also the target of SOM019 and, four years later he was the target of SOM030. The official said a small number of others present, perhaps four or five, were wounded. Government spokesman Abdirahman Dinari said it was not known how many people were killed, ‘but we understand there were a lot of casualties. Most were Islamic fighters.’

Type of action: Air operation, AC-130 gunship
Location: Hayo, Garer, Bankajirow and Badmadow, Ras Kamboni
References: WikiLeaks dipomatic cable, CBS, Los Angeles Times, Long War Journal

SOM016
January 9 2007
♦ 4-31 civilians reported killed, including 1 child
Heavy civilian casualties were reported in airstrikes on Hayi near Afmadow, on Hayi, 250km northwest of Ras Kamboni, and other parts of southern Somalia, in confusing reports which may conflate activity by US and other forces. An elder told Reuters 22-27 people had been killed, while a Somali politician told CBS News that 31 civilians ‘including a newlywed couple’ had been killed by two helicopters near Afmadow, while Mohamed Mahmud Burale told AP that at least four civilians were killed on Monday evening in Hayi, including his four-year-old son.

Type of action: Air operation, possibly helicopter
Location: Hayi
References: AP via ChinaDaily, CBS, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Reuters

CBS News report on US action in Somalia in 2007

SOM017
January 23 2007
♦ 8 total reported killed
♦ Possible civilians reported killed
A fresh JSOC AC-130 strike in Somalia, reportedly operating from an airbase in eastern Ethiopia, targeted Ahmed Madobe, a deputy of ICU leader Hassan Turki. Madobe survived the attack but was wounded and captured, he later told The Nation’s Jeremy Scahill. His eight companions, who Madobe said included men and women ‘on the run’ with him, were all killed. Madobe told the Nation:

At around 4am we woke up to perform the dawn prayers, and that’s when the planes started to hit us. The entire airspace was full of planes. There was AC-130, helicopters and fighter jets. The sky was full of strikes. They were hitting us, pounding us with heavy weaponry.

At around 10am, he added, Ethiopian and US forces landed by helicopter and captured him. Somalia Report said the attack was on an al Qaeda supply convoy, and ‘follow-up operations’ confirmed the strike killed Tariq Abdullah.

Type of action: Air operation, AC-130 gunship and ground assault, capture
Location: Waldena
References: AP via Washington Post, WikiLeaks diplomatic cable, The Nation, Army Times, Between Threats and War (Zenko) p. 146, International Crisis Group, Somalia Report, Reuters, New York Times

SOM018
March 2007
A single source claims an SAS unit entered Somalia with members of US Delta Force (part of JSOC) to identify the remains of British and other foreign fighters killed in SOM014. The joint mission took DNA samples from 50 exhumed bodies and four British citizens were identified, the report claimed.

Type of action: Ground operation
Location: Hayo
Reference: Daily Mail

SOM019
June 1 2007
♦ 8-12 reported killed
♦ Five gunmen captured
The destroyer USS Chafee, sailing off the coast of Somalia, fired ‘more than a dozen rounds from its 5-inch gun’ on militants in Bargal, north Somalia (some reports also claimed that a cruise missile was fired). Somali spokesmen claimed the strike was launched after around 35 heavily armed militants landed on the coast near Bargal and attacked local forces. The New York Times and Micah Zenko reported that a small number of US operatives – working alongside Somali forces to hunt high-value targets believed to be among the militants – came under fire, prompting the missile launch, enabling the US and Ethiopian troops to escape. Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, the suspected mastermind of the 1998 embassy bombings, was among the targets, according to MSNBC and Zenko. The strike killed eight to twelve alleged militants, reportedly including men from the UK, US, Eritrea, Sweden and Yemen. Five militants were captured, a Somali official told the Chicago Tribune. The US operatives comprised three counterterrorism officials who were ‘investigating the computers that the militants were carrying,’ Hassan Dahir, the vice-president of Puntland, told the New York Times.

Type of action: Naval operation, naval bombardment
Location: Bargal, Puntland
References: Between Threats and War (Zenko) p.147, Army Times, Stars and Stripes, Chicago Tribune, New York Times, MSNBC, Long War Journal, Telegraph

SOM020
June 7 2007
The US announced it had detained and rendered suspected al Qaeda member Abdullahi Sudi Arale, a leading member of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) who it described as ‘an extremely dangerous terror suspect‘, with links to Islamist forces in Somalia. Arale had been detained in the Horn of Africa and transferred to the US military prison in Guantanamo Bay, the Pentagon said:

Abdullahi Sudi Arale is suspected of being a member of the Al Qaeda terrorist network in East Africa, serving as a courier between East Africa Al Qaeda (EAAQ) and Al Qaeda in Pakistan. Since his return from Pakistan to Somalia in September 2006, he has held a leadership role in the EAAQ-affiliated Somali Council of Islamic Courts (CIC). There is significant information available indicating that Arale has been assisting various EAAQ-affiliated extremists in acquiring weapons and explosives, and has facilitated terrorist travel by providing false documents for AQ and EAAQ-affiliates and foreign fighters traveling into Somalia. Arale played a significant role in the re-emergence of the CIC in Mogadishu.

Type of action: Ground operation, rendition
Location: Somalia
References: BBC, Pentagon  

SOM021
March 2 2008
♦ 4-6 total reported killed
♦ 4 civilians reported killed
♦ 6-8 reported injured
The US fired at least one cruise missile at Dhobley, a town in southern Somalia near the Kenyan border, Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman told AFP. ‘On March 2, the US conducted an attack against a known Al-Qaeda terrorist in southern Somalia,’ he said. The Long War Journal reported the strike targeted Ras Kamboni Brigades leader Hassan Turki and al Qaeda leader Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan. The town was bombed and civilian targets hit in an attack carried out by a US AC-130 gunship, an Islamist spokesman said. A local elder, Abdullahi Sheikh Duale, said four civilians were killed. A police officer told AP eight people were wounded in the strike, while an aid worker in Dhobley said up to six people were still trapped in the rubble by midday, and a minimum of two bombs were dropped.

Type of action: Air operation, possibly AC-130 gunship
Location: Dhobley
References: AFP, Bloomberg, Monsters and Critics, Long War Journal, Associated Press

SOM022
May 1 2008
♦ 15+ total reported killed
♦ 5+ civilians reported killed
In May 2008, US naval-launched cruise missiles killed Aden Hashi Ayro (see also SOM014), the head of the Somali Islamist movement al Shabaab, which had growing ties with Al Qaeda. Some reports claimed an AC-130 was also involved. After Ayro’s death al Shabaab reportedly suspected the US had tracked him through his iPhone and banned the use of similar devices. An American military official in Washington told the New York Times:

[A]t least four Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from a Navy ship or submarine off the Somali coast had slammed into a small compound of single-story buildings in Dusa Marreb, a well-known hide-out for Mr. Ayro and his associates. The military official and two American intelligence officials said all indications were that Mr. Ayro was killed, along with several top lieutenants, but the attack was still being assessed.

Insurgent leaders had been meeting in Dusa Marreb, al Shabaab-controlled broadcaster Shabelle reported, putting the death toll at 15. A Shabaab spokesman, Mukhtar Ali Robow, told Reuters: ‘Infidel planes bombed Dusa Marreb… Two of our important people, including Ayro, were killed.’ Sheikh Muhyadin Omar was among the dead, according to the Long War Journal and Africa Confidential. Residents said ‘several other Shabaab fighters and civilians were killed, Reuters reported. Half a dozen senior Al Shabaab commanders and Ayro’s brother were killed in the strike, according to Africa Confidential. Ayro’s wife and children, and people from nearby houses, were also reported dead.

Type of action: Naval operation, cruise missiles and possible air assault, AC-130 gunship
Location: Dusa Marreb town, central Somalia
References: Army Times, Christian Science Monitor, AllAfrica.com, Time, Between Threats and War (Zenko) p. 151, New York Times, Reuters, Africa Confidential, Long War Journal, Long War Journal

SOM023
March 14 2009
Apparently confirming US fears of a militant link between Somalia and al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden used an audio recording, posted on Jihadi websites, to urge Somalis to ‘fight on‘ against their newly elected president, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmad, CBS News reported. ‘Bin Laden asked Muslim youths to disseminate extremist literature online‘, the report claimed. Ken Menkhaus, professor of political science at Davidson University and Somalia expert, felt bin Laden’s message would only bolster support for the new president. ‘There’s nothing that plays as poorly in Somalia as foreigners trying to advance their own agenda in Somalia — telling them who they may or may not have as a leader — and al-Qaeda is falling into that category. In some ways, you could not script this any better for the new government. On paper, it all looks excellent,’ he told TIME.

References: CBS News, The Independent, YouTube, TIME

SOM024
April 12 2009
♦ 3 reported killed
In a hostage rescue operation, JSOC Navy Seal Team 6 commandos were authorised to shoot three pirates off the Somali coast. On April 9, the pirates had stormed the decks of the US container ship Maersk Alabama, taking captain Richard Phillips hostage. The pirates escaped on a covered lifeboat, threatening to kill Phillips unless they received a £2m ransom payment. On April 11 President Obama agreed that Navy Seals could use deadly force if the captain’s life was in danger. The following evening, Seal snipers positioned on the USS Bainbridge saw a pirate pointing a gun at Phillips. Three snipers each fired a single round, killing the three pirates, before rescuing Phillips. According to the New York Times, Phillips was then ‘flown to the Boxer, an amphibious assault ship also off the Somali coast’. The Boxer, a JSOC ship, also featured in the 2011 capture and rendition off the Yemen coast of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame.

Location: Off the coast of Somalia
References: The Daily Beast, New York Times, The Guardian, Los Angeles Times

SOM025
September 14 2009
♦ 2-6 reported killed
♦ 2 reported injured
US Special Forces launched a helicopter raid into Somalia, killing Kenyan Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, wanted in connection with the Mombasa attacks. ’We’d been tracking him for years,’ a senior military official told Sean D. Naylor, in the Army Times. ’We knew his travel route, we knew the vehicles he was using‘. A detailed report in the Daily Beast outlines how the operation unfolded. Dubbed Operation ‘Celestial Balance’, the job fell to the elite Seal Team 6, under the command of JSOC. Three options were mooted: to fire Tomahawk cruise missiles from a warship off the Somali coast; a helicopter attack on the convoy, or a ‘snatch and grab’ operation attempting to take Nabhan alive. Deciding on the helicopter assault, the US learned Nabhan’s convoy would be setting off from Mogadishu to meet Islamic militants in the coastal town of Baraawe, the Beast reported. As the convoy neared Barawe, JSOC struck. Multiple 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment AH-6 Little Bird helicopters flew from a Navy ship and attacked the militants as they were breakfasting, killing six, including Nabhan, according to news reports. However, NPR radio reported that Seal commandos fired missiles into Nabhan’s car. The Army Times and Daily Beast stated that one helicopter landed and operators jumped out and loaded the bodies of Nabhan and three others into the aircraft, in order to retrieve Nabhan’s DNA. Following this operation, a Pentagon official told the Daily Beast the US Special Ops Forces wanted to increase their use of Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE), ‘not just to kill terror targets but to rummage through their belongings‘, but ‘the president was not supportive‘ and this became a bone of contention between Special Ops and the Obama administration, said the Beast.

Type of action: Air operation, helicopter and ground assault, body retrieval 
Location: Barawe
References: ABC, Guardian, Time, Army Times, Air Force Times, NPR, The Daily Beast

 SOM026
September 22 2009
A diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks revealed unarmed US drones would soon fly from a base in the Seychelles on missions over Somalia: ‘Counter-terrorism missions will involve intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance flights over the Horn of Africa to support ongoing counter-terrorism efforts. The UAVs originating from Seychelles and flying counter-terrorism mission will not conduct direct attacks.’ ABC News has since reported ‘US Africa Command has been flying drones out of the Seychelles since 2009 as part of anti-piracy measures in the Indian Ocean.’ The WikiLeaks cable revealed 77 US personnel would be located in Mahe, the capital, to launch, recover and maintain the drones.

Location: Mahe, Seychelles
References: WikiLeaks cable, ABC

SOM027
September 30 2009
A secret directive, the ‘Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Execute Order’, was signed by General David Petraeu, chief of Central Command, authorszing ‘the sending of American Special Operations troops to both friendly and hostile nations in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa to gather intelligence and build ties with local forces,’ according to the New York Times. The order, which an official said ‘was drafted in close coordination with Admiral Eric T. Olson, the officer in charge of the United States Special Operations Command‘, called for clandestine activities that ‘cannot or will not be accomplished‘ by conventional military operations or ‘interagency activities.’

Reference: New York Times

SOM028
October 19 2009
Al Shabaab militants claimed they had shot down a US surveillance drone just off the coast near to Kismayo. ‘The suspected US aircraft had been flying in Kismayo airspace for days before being shot down two miles north-east of the town on Monday morning,’ an unnamed Islamist official told the BBC. ‘We think it fell into the sea. We are still searching for it’. ’It fell into the water and our fighters are trying to locate it,’ al Shabaab spokesman Sheikh Hassan Yacqub told Reuters. But US Navy spokesman Lieutenant Nathan Christensen told Reuters all drones had been safely recovered.

SOM029
Summer 2010
According to the Guardian, in summer 2010 the UK began drawing up ‘contingency plans’ for airstrikes on beach camps in Somalia, having become highly concerned about the threat to Britain and Europe posed by pirates and Islamic insurgents. ‘The UK has also considered plans for attacking targets in places where al-Shabaab and the pirates appear to co-exist, particularly in southern Somalia’, the Guardian reported.

Location: coastal and southern Somalia
Reference: The Guardian

SOM030
April 3-6 2011
♦ 1-36 reported killed
After a reporting gap of 18 months, US air attacks may have resumed. Reports of intense fighting for control of the town of Dhobley between al Shabaab and Somali forces mention an air strike, which Shabelle reports killed several militants. Somalia Report stated: ‘on April 6, shortly after the exploitation of data from captured al-Qaeda cell phones and laptops, three dozen al Shabab members were killed‘, although later reports say only one commander was killed. Jabreel Malik Muhammed was killed in the strike, according to the Observer (Uganda).

Type of action: Air operation, airstrike
Location: Dhobley
References: The Observer (Uganda), AllAfrica, Long War Journal, Somalia Report, Al Arabiya, Somalia Report

SOM031
June 23 2011
♦ 2+ reported killed
♦ 2-3 reported injured
In the first known lethal drone strike in Somalia, Predators struck a militant training camp 10km south of Kismayo. Further missiles hit a second target near the airport. The attacks were aimed at two senior militants who were planning an imminent terrorist attack on the UK, US officials told the Washington Post. Abdirashid Mohamed Hidig, Somalia’s deputy defence minister, told AP the strike killed ‘many’ foreign fighters. ‘I have their names, but I don’t want to release them,’ he claimed. Ibrahim al Afghani, also known as Ibrahim Haji Jama Mead, a senior leader in al Shabaab, was reportedly wounded or killed, although Strategic Forecasting claimed on August 11 that Afghani was alive and had replaced Ahmed Abdi Godane as the emir of al Shabaab. Al Shabaab has not responded to either report, and Afghani has not appeared in public since. Two militants were wounded, according to a local al Shabaab leader, Sheik Hassan Yaqub, while resident Mohammed Aden reported seeing three wounded militants. Among them was British citizen Bilal al Barjawi, killed in a subsequent drone strike, SOM052. US helicopters reportedly landed after the attack, with troops retrieving some dead and injured. The strike was the first joint mission conducted by JSOC and the CIA, CNN claimed.

A witness who gave his name as Osman told the New York Times there were two strikes: ‘One hit a car, which I believe held explosives.’ The strike was confirmed to AP by a US official in Washington. Barjawi was known to have been injured in airstrikes in June 2011 (SOM031) and was suspected to have sought medical assistance in Nairobi at that time. The Guardian reported Barjawi’s wife was understood to have given birth to a child in a London hospital a few hours before the attack, prompting suspicions that his location had been pinpointed through a telephone conversation between the couple. The killing caused a rift within al-Qaeda, reports suggested, with al-Shabaab calling an emergency meeting after the drone strike, amid accusations that leaders ‘may be involved in this latest killing to pursue their own goals’.

Type of action: Air operation, drone strike
Location: Elasha Biyaha, 15km south of Mogadishu
Reference: Somalia Report, Al Shabaab press, Long War Journal, Associated Press, The Guardian, Somalia Report, New York Times, The Telegraph, Reuters, Long War Journal, allAfrica.com

SOM053
January 21 2012
♦ 6 reported killed
Further south, another airstrike killed six people near the insurgent stronghold of Kismayo, according to Sheikh Mohamud Abdi, a senior al-Shabaab commander. It is not known whether the strike was by US or Kenyan forces. Kenya sent troops into Somalia in October amid concerns that Somalia’s 21-year-old civil war was spilling over the countries’ border.

Type of action: Reported air operation, possible US airstrike
Location: Kismayo
Reference: The Guardian

SOM054
January 22 2012
People fled their homes in the rebel-held area of Elasha Biyaha on the outskirts of Mogadishu, ‘for fear of drone attacks targeting foreign and Al-Shabaab militants in the area‘, Somali radio station Bar Kulan reported. The station’s correspondent said most were women and children who had earlier left the capital and camped in Elasha Biyaha, but had returned following the previous day’s strikes. Somalia Report stated they spoke with a resident who lived near the site of SOM053. ‘We are scared of more strikes because Al-Shabaab fighters live around here and they might be potential targets … Shrapnel and dust was flying away from the impact area and if it happens again it might be fatal,’ he told Somalia Report.

Location: Elasha Biyaha
Reference: Bar Kulan, Somalia Report

SOM055
January 25 2012
Reported killed: 9 pirates
A US special forces raid freed two aid workers, American Jessica Buchanan and Dane Poul Hagen Thisted, who had been kidnapped by pirates. NBC News, citing US officials, said two teams landed by helicopter and rescued the hostages after a gun battle with the kidnappers. The freed hostages were taken by helicopter to an undisclosed location. According to Associated Press, the task force involved in the rescue was Navy Seal Team Six – the team that killed Osama Bin Laden. Galmudug leader Mohamed Ahmed Alim told Reuters nine pirates were killed and five captured during the rescue operation. President Obama said he authorised the operation to rescue Buchanan:

Thanks to the extraordinary courage and capabilities of our Special Operations Forces, yesterday Jessica Buchanan was rescued and she is on her way home. As Commander-in-Chief, I could not be prouder of the troops who carried out this mission, and the dedicated professionals who supported their efforts.

Type of action: Ground operation, rescue mission.
Location: Galmudug
References: Reuters, NBC News, Associated Press video, Associated Press, BBC

AP report on hostage release

SOM056
February 3 2012
A surveillance drone reportedly crashed in a refugee camp in Mogadishu. There were no reported casualties and nothing to indicate the origins of the drone. According to AP, refugees and soldiers in Badbado camp said they watched the drone crash into a hut ‘made of sticks, corrugated cans and plastic bags‘.

Location: Mogadishu
Reference: Associated Press

SOM057
February 9 2012
In a video posted on Islamist forums, Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahri said that Al Shabaab had officially joined the al Qaeda global network. According to the Telegraph, ‘analysts said the move appeared partly a propaganda gambit by an al Qaeda leadership weakened by drone strikes and a failure to carry out a major successful attack in the West since 2005‘.

References: Somali War Monitor, The Telegraph, Reuters, New York Times

SOM058
February 21 2012
Britain is to contribute £20m to a ‘stability fund’ for Somalia, which will pay for a civilian force of ‘chino-clad warriors’ to assist the Somali government, the Telegraph reported. In addition, the Guardian reported that Britain and other EU countries were ‘considering helicopters from warships to mount off shore raids on the logistical hubs and training camps belonging to pirates and al-Shabaab militants in the country’. A Whitehall source told the newspaper: ‘We don’t have the assets in place…that does not mean we could not get them in the air quickly.’ Another official added, ‘there was no political will on this to begin with, but that has been changing. We know where the camps are, where they set up and where they launch from.’ In an interview with the BBC Somali service, David Cameron explained the threat he believed al Shabaab posed: ‘Al-Shabaab encourages violent jihad not just in Somalia but also outside Somalia’, he said. ‘And there is a very real danger of young British Somalis having their minds poisoned by this organisation.’

Location: throughout Somalia
References: the Guardian, the Telegraph, BBC Somali Service via al Arabiya

When David Cameron told Parliament on January 11 that the Coalition’s controversial housing benefits reform  were already  reducing private sector rents, housing bodies and industry magazine Inside Housing smelt a rat.

‘What we have seen so far, as housing benefit has been reformed and reduced, is that rent levels have come down, so we have stopped ripping off the taxpayer,’ Cameron said as the Welfare Bill reached a crucial stage in the House of Lords.

The prime minister asserted that landlords had agreed to lower their rents in exchange for councils paying housing benefit directly to them.

Inside Housing set out to investigate.

It found just 36 of the 204 English councils that responded to Inside Housing’s Freedom of Information requests said they had seen any reduction in rents. And even in those councils it was a ‘minuscule’ number of landlords who had agreed to lower their rents. Twice as many councils said they had seen no change.

In Leeds, just 0.7% of rents had fallen, while Chelmsford Council told Inside Housing a ‘vanishingly small number’ of landlords had agreed to lower rents.

Instead, Inside Housing reports, private landlords are increasingly turning away tenants eligible for housing benefit - particularly in areas with high demand for rental properties, such as London. Research by estate agency LSL Estates shows rents have increased by 4% nationwide.

‘It is possible the government’s plans to make LHA [local housing allowance] rates more affordable may conflict with what is actually financially viable in some areas,’ a National Landlords Association spokesman said to Inside Housing.

This weekend, the Guardian reported that Croydon Council was seeking private rented accommodation as far afield as Hull, where demand for housing – and therefore rents – are lower.

When Number 10 was challenged by housing bodies over the accuracy of Cameron’s statements, a spokesman said the government was ‘hearing of cases’ where landlords were lowering their rents – but did not provide any evidence to back up the claim.

Inside Housing’s research showed Cameron’s claim was ‘simply not true’, editor Stuart Macdonald said in an editorial. ‘Mr Cameron has misled parliament and should set the record straight.’

Nearly three quarters of people surveyed think corruption is a major problem in the UK, according to a recent poll from the European Commission.

The report compiled feedback from a EU-wide public opinion survey, and found the UK lagging behind many of its European neighbours when it comes to public perception of corruption.

Interviews with around 1300 people across the UK revealed that a third of UK citizens think that bribery or abuse of power is widespread among the police. By comparison the Finnish seem relatively confident in their police force, with just 7% considering abuse of power as an issue for police in Finland.

A string of stories this week on tax avoidance techniques used by top government civil servants has done little to bolster the public’s view of transparency in UK government. Indeed the European Commission’s report finds that 58% of the those asked in the UK see bribery or abuse of power is widespread among politicians.

However, the UK is not the worst contender. Cyprus and Slovenia score high levels of corruption, while an astonishing 98% of those asked in Greece saw corruption as a major problem.

Corruption is not simply a matter of principles, there is also a significant economic impact. The costs incurred by corruption in the EU are around £100 billion per year. Worrying then that the majority of Europeans (70%) think that corruption is unavoidable and that it has always existed.

Important to note is the fact that the report looks at public perception rather than any systematic analysis of actual levels of corruption. In fact the report states that less than a third of Europeans agree that they are personally affected by corruption in their daily live.

The question then arises as to where these perceptions of corruption come from, if not experienced personally. Here the media surely has a role to play in digging out and exposing corruption and generally raising awareness. It would be interesting if the report had considered the source of these perceptions as well.

In many ways the survey is wider than it is deep, with relatively small pools of people being asked in each country. While this certainly provides an interesting insight into how corruption is perceived one cannot help but wonder whether resources would have been better used exploring the actual realities of corruption, though charting examples of bad practice, exploring efficiency of judicial systems, and analysing political processes.

The European Commission’s report on corruption is certainly useful in highlighting the endemic and costly nature of corruption within the EU, but one cannot help but think there are more productive methods that could be employed to really get to the heart of the issue.

Read the full report here.

While big names and juicy details have poured out of the Leveson Inquiry, the House of Lords have quietly got on with a media project of their own. The Committee on Communications conducted a series of hearings into the future of investigative journalism – and the report, published today, contains some intriguing suggestions.

As part of a comprehensive analysis of the current state of investigative journalism, The Future of Investigative Journalism praises the Bureau as an innovative and ‘non-traditional’ model for providing such reporting, comparing it to US investigative non-profits like ProPublica.

The report acknowledges that ‘serious investigative reporting’ is an essential element of a healthy democracy, and that it is currently beset by ‘economic, legal and regulatory challenges’.

Of all these, the economic challenges are the most pressing. It’s a measure of just how serious they are that the Lords recommend the rules surrounding charitable purposes should be rewritten to include investigative journalism. Culture secretary Jeremy Hunt has refused to legislate around this, but the report calls on him to reverse this decision.

The report highlights the hurdles that have so far prevented the Bureau from achieving charitable status.

Dr David Levy of the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism explained that investigative reporting could be seen as ‘partisan or as running some kind of line and it might be more difficult to say that it complied with existing UK charity law’ – although it’s also hard to see how many mainstream charity campaigns are not partisan.

Meanwhile, the Charity Law Association pointed out that investigative reporting does not always offer ‘a reasonable expectation of a beneficial outcome’ – one of the requirements of charitable law – but added that the laws should be changed to explicitly include investigative journalism.

This isn’t the report’s only suggestion for new funding models: it also proposes a fund for investigative journalism and for training, made up of fines levied for breaches of the print and broadcast codes of practice by a beefed-up Press Complaints Commission and by Ofcom. At the moment, the report points out, fines levied by Ofcom go straight to the Treasury.

The vision of, say, a non-profit news agency funding a major investigative project, using money that was paid by a red-top because of a poorly judged sex scandal, has a certain piquancy. But, as the report admits, choosing which projects would receive the funding and ensuring money was being spent correctly would be a fraught process.

In the public interest
The committee takes a commendably nuanced view of when it’s acceptable for investigative journalists to break the law, highlighting the projects when deception – whether for undercover reporting, paying for the CD of MPs’ expenses data, or breaching privacy to find out key details – could be argued to be in the public interest. Paul Lewis of the Guardian points to the Panorama care homes story as a key instance of a story that could not have been obtained in a purely ‘above-board’ way.

The Lords suggest that the definition of what is in the public interest should remain fluid, but editors and reporters should adopt rigid processes for recording the processes by which they decided breaking the law was in the public interest.

Clearly, some organisations already have just such a system in place. Alan Rusbridger of the Guardian outlines his ‘five-bar’ process, step four of which is ‘a kind of audit trail’, while Al Anstey of Al Jazeera outlines ‘three levels of check and balance’. The Lords decide two steps is probably enough, but they recommend that this becomes a key part of decision-making within organisations.

The emphasis is on due process and considered lawbreaking where absolutely necessary. Meanwhile, the government should consider inserting a public interest defence into any new laws, while prosecuting authorities should ‘publish their broad approach’ as to when they would consider transgressions to be in the public interest.

But civil law can be just as effective for silencing investigative journalism, and the report glances over this, assuming the forthcoming Defamation Bill will tackle this effectively.

One of the most unexpected twists is the report’s treatment of the growth of PR: it calls for a stringent code of conduct for an industry that’s currently unregulated, and is particularly damning of political spin. The report calls on the Coalition to ensure ‘that their press releases are universally transparent and straightforward’.

It also picks up on the flaws in the government’s datastore – a common gripe among data reporters.

Given that the committee met in the fallout of the phone-hacking scandal – which the report calls ‘perhaps the greatest political media scandal of a generation’ – the Lords report is a welcome blast of Establishment support for investigative journalism. It celebrates the medium’s recent successes and underlines, again and again, how important it is as a mechanism for identifying wrongdoing and holding power to account.

It is hard to imagine the end result of the Leveson Inquiry: by now, it has become a sprawling beast devouring all aspects of media culture. By contrast, the Future of Investigative Journalism is a focused and reasonably thorough analysis of one form of journalism, containing some pragmatic advice.

More than 25 senior Department of Health staff are paid salaries direct to limited companies, documents sent to the Guardian have revealed.

The Guardian reports this procedure has the likely effect of reducing tax bills.  In some cases the individuals are being paid more than £250,000 a year, as well as further expenses.

The total payments come to almost £4.2m in one year, the paper reports.

The single largest payment was £273,375. Nineteen of the staff are paid more than £100,000.

The DoH has apologised for the situation. The Guardian quotes one Whitehall source as saying: “We cannot defend these arrangements, but it may be it is very common in Whitehall and this is just the tip of an iceberg.”

The article states that in most cases the companies’ names are in fact little more than an adaptation of the individual’s surname.

The paper reports that in a written question last December by Gareth Thomas, the shadow Cabinet Office minister, the Department of Health was asked if any health department staff were paid by means of payments to limited companies in lieu of salary.

The health minister Simon Burns said in a written parliamentary answer that no payments were being made to civil servants in this way.

He also stated: ‘It is not the department’s policy to permit payments to civil servants by ways of limited companies.’

In a new statement on Wednesday, the department said: “The definition of staff in this context refers to civil servants, and we can confirm that no civil servant who is an employee of the Department of Health is paid in this way. To this extent it was certainly not our intention to mislead anyone involved.

‘We would be happy to clarify the situation in greater detail with anyone who asks and apologise for any misunderstanding involved. We are currently carrying out a full audit of such arrangements in line with the recently announced Treasury review of tax arrangements of public sector appointments.’

Read the full story here.

South Africa’s Daily Maverick, an online news and analysis site, hailed the Bureau as a saviour of investigative journalism that has bucked the trend towards fast-breaking, 24-hour news.

In particular, the publication praised the Bureau’s on-going investigation into drone strikes that has contradicted President Obama’s assertion that the use of drones is a “targeted, focused effort” which had “not caused a huge number of civilian casualties”.

Also highlighted were investigations into conflicts of interests of scientists recommending Tamiflu to the WHO, an award-winning nine-month investigation into how the European Union’s structural funds pot was used and the high-profile story on lobbying within the Tory party.

The Daily Maverick contrasts the work of the Bureau with statistics from a 2006 study that found although 42% of the largest newspapers in the US expressed “a lot” of interest in investigative reporting, 37% of newspapers had no full-time investigative reporters.

It goes on to quote David Sirota who lamented what he called “Watergate’s lost legacy…Though there are certainly some very fine investigative reporters left, they have become a rare breed, usually replaced by blow-dried blowhards who spend more time sucking up to power than challenging it.”

The article concludes: “Many journalists and editors will sigh with envy at the thought of being able to devote nine months to a single investigation. But sometimes, it seems, that’s simply how long it takes to get at the truth. It’s an unpopular idea in a world of Twitter-broken news.”

Read the full article here.

As fears over Iran’s nuclear capabilities intensify, the United Nations has turned to economic sanctions in an attempt to force the regime to rein in its nuclear programme. This issue is explored in both BBC’s File on 4 and a Reuters Special report in recent days.

The combination of the two reports gives an enlightening view of trade both in and out of Iran, revealing an imbalance in the system: imports to Iran from the UK are being stopped while Iranian exports are still slipping through the net of sanctions.

Exporting to Iran- File on 4

Within the first minute of last night’s File on 4 on Iran, we hear a weary businessman explaining the crippling effect of the UN trade sanctions on Iran. ‘In the end I lost everything,’ he sighs.

However these are not the words of the downtrodden in Iran but a British supplier whose company has lost millions from the UK’s ban on trade with the Middle Eastern country.

David Lewis’s report for the BBC charts the way that economic sanctions on Iran are negatively effecting UK industry.

Interviews with businessmen in the UK highlight a sense of frustration. Exports to Iran are being stopped with the suggestion that they may aid the Iranian government’s nuclear capabilities. However in many of the cases featured in the programme, the link to atomic weaponry, or even energy, is tenuous at best.

Richard Clark, an engineer, describes how his company had a lucrative order for gas turbine parts with Iran, which was stopped by export authorities. Clark had consulted all of the appropriate bodies before confirming the order, but the fifth consignment of parts was stopped with officials telling him a change in rules meant he now needed an export licence. The licence was refused and Clark lost business worth millions of pounds, forcing his company into administration.

Clark is adamant that his products could not be used for nuclear production. Instead they work to generate electricity. It is this generation of power, which could theoretically be used in nuclear production that stopped his products being allowed through the system.

‘I couldn’t understand the logic behind the decision,’ said Clark. ‘You could use the same argument for absolutely anything being exported to Iran.’

However the ambiguity around what can be exported is partly explained through the existence of ‘dual use goods’, products that may appear innocent but could have more sinister usage. This is not a new concept. It is reminiscent of the Nazi’s use of Zyklon B, an insecticide used to kill concentration camp inmates during World War II.

However, as Lewis’ report suggests, these export restrictions are not stopping the Iranian government from purchasing products. They simply turn to other countries to supply the goods they need. While the programme suggests this, we are not provided with any hard evidence on import rates in Iran, or indeed the effect of this on costs for the Iranian regime.

Even British goods which are granted export licences cannot be sold because clearing banks will not process payments from Iran.

Since 2011 it has been an offence for UK banks to have any dealings with Iranian banks, a move which came after pressure from US banks. As a results some businesses have been left out of pocket, having never been paid for their business with Iran.

Lewis talks to Lord Lamont, chairman of the British-Iranian Chamber of Commerce. Lamont suggests the US banking industry essentially strong-armed the UK banks into shunning all contact with Iranian money. US Treasury officials denied the suggestions.

The issue then becomes to what extent the UK economy is damaging itself over these seemingly inefficient sanctions. ‘The problem with sanctions is we think we’re imposing a cost on them, but we’re also imposing a cost on ourselves, in terms of lost jobs, lost output and in some cases bankruptcy of the firms involved,’ Lamont explains.

The sanctions are not without basis. Ahmadinejad’s government already has a uranium enrichment plant in operation and another is in the process of being built. The UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency has expressed real concern over procurement patterns which suggest a ‘critical mass of indicators’ that a nuclear weapons programme may be underway.

But Hans Blix, the former head of the UN weapons inspectors writing in tomorrow’s New Statesman, casts doubt on Iran having a nuclear weapons programme saying, ‘It is possible – but is denied by Iran and not evident to me – that there is a determination to make a nuclear weapon.’

Alistair Burt from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office suggests that while economic sanctions may not be entirely successful they are preferable to the alternatives which he describes as ‘some form of (military) strike to delay the nuclear programme, or Iran becomes nuclear capable.’

Whether the sanctions are effective or not, Lewis’s programme offers some touching case studies of those affected by the trade sanctions. However it falls short in quantifying just what kind of economic impact this is having on British industry. Lewis mentions having heard numerous examples, but as a listener we never get a real idea of the scale of the issue.

The other side of the coin – exports from Iran

With serendipitous timing Reuters today published a Special Report which goes some way to completing the File on 4 story.

In an excellent example of in-depth data analysis Reuters have tracked the movements of an Iranian shipping agency to reveal that, despite trade sanctions on the country, Iran is still managing to export goods around the world.

Reuters drew on complex information from IHS Fairplay, a ship tracking group, as well as the Reuters Freight Fundamentals database to track the trajectories of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) ships.  Analysis of the data reveals that 130 of the 144 ships banned from exporting continue to call at many of the world’s major ports.

This ‘cat-and-mouse game’ comes with its own tricks of the trade, including changing the names and flags that ships sail under. The article notes a marked increase in the frequency of these kind of changes since the UN sanctions were imposed, suggesting these are not casual changes but intentional attempts to evade tracking. In the 40 months since the sanctions came into play IRISL ships have changed names 157 times, changed flags 94 times amd changed their registered ownership 127 times.

Despite these changes to the appearance of the vessels Reuters manages to trace back ownership of seemingly unconnected ships to Iran.

The story starts in a port in Singapore where Reuters reporters use unique seven-figure ‘IMO numbers’, assigned to ships, to identify ships now operating out of Barbados and Malta as ultimately owned by the Iranian cargo line.

Although to be fair, the reporters had something of a tip-off. For all the cloak-and-dagger changing of names on registers, the brightly painted IRISL containers on the ship’s decks are a bit of a give away.

The report delves into the way cargo is processed through Singapore. However, fresh on the heels of File on 4′s insight into the effect of sanctions on the UK, it is the European angle which is particularly shocking. Reuters find that 23 sanctioned Iranian ships have visited 12 EU ports since July 2010, when the EU imposed its first sanctions on IRISL. The report also finds that many Iran-linked ships fly under flags of Malta and Cyprus.

Reports from authorities in Malta suggest trade with Iran has been declining. ‘We have made it so difficult for IRISL ships that they have reduced their operation to Malta to almost nil- even though technically they can still come’, said Joseph Cole, chairman of the Maltese sanctions monitoring board. However reporters find 18 ships have visited Malta’s Freeport over the last two years and IRISL shipping containers still litter Freeport’s yards.

More worryingly Malta is also reportedly home to 24 shell companies that are used to conceal Iran’s ownership of vessels. The country’s public shipping register is scoured to reveal Iranian ships switching flags, names, registered owners, registered agents and addresses of owners and agents.

The article reveals an incredibly tangled web of aliases, shell companies and changes in ownership designed to make it impossible to track the comings and goings of these vessels. More credit then to the ten journalists that worked on the Reuters report and managed to find strong evidence that trading is going on.

What is more, the article really takes the reader on the investigative journey with the journalists. We are told of attempts to track down officials, journalists turning up on doorsteps only to be turned away and the the complex sifting of databases. The digging down into registers, data files and talking to sources illuminates a complex, colourful and intriguing story full.

If there is one criticism of the piece, it is that the reader is left wondering about the next stages of the story. In an article that already runs to nearly 3,000 words there are limitations. But still there is only ever a fleeting mention of the actual contents of these cargo ships and we are left wondering what is the next stage once the cargo makes it through the docks. Are these products ending up in our local shops?

Both File on 4 and Reuters offer interesting insights into the efficacy of the trade sanctions being imposed on Iran. While neither report shows us inside the country itself, for obvious enough reasons, both go a long way to revealing the fascinating reverberations that UN trade sanctions can have.

Like the breakwash behind the illicit Iranian ocean tankers, the ripple effect of Iran’s sanction are felt for miles around.

Read Reuter’s Special Report here or listen to File on 4 here.